Author: Ambassador Bonnie Jenkins
On February 6, the last arms control treaty between the U.S. and Russia will expire. The New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) is the latest in a series of treaties between the United States and Russia, dating back to the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT) I in 1972, the first Cold War-era agreement. The New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START) was signed on April 8, 2010, in Prague by the United States and Russia and entered into force on Feb. 5, 2011. New START replaced the 1991 START I treaty, which expired in December 2009.
New START places limits on the U.S. and Russia in the following areas:
700 deployed intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), deployed submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), and deployed heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments.[1]
1,550 nuclear warheads on deployed ICBMs, deployed SLBMs, and deployed heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments (each such heavy bomber is counted as one warhead toward this limit);
800 deployed and non-deployed ICBM launchers, SLBM launchers, and heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments.
1,550 warheads on 700 delivery vehicles - missiles, bombers, and submarines.
Why is this important? These treaties have led to significant reductions in each country’s nuclear weapons stockpile. In 2024, the U.S. Department of Defense’s National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) noted that as of September 2023, the U.S. stockpile of nuclear warheads totaled 3,748. This number represents an 88 percent reduction from the United States’ maximum number of approximately nuclear weapons (31,255) at the end of fiscal year 1967. Based on that data, approximately 2,000 additional nuclear warheads are awaiting dismantlement. See, Transparency in the U.S. Nuclear Weapons Stockpile. Russia has also reduced its nuclear weapons stockpile. Russia currently possesses approximately 5,459 to 5,580 nuclear warheads, including a number awaiting dismantlement. The number of nuclear weapons is also a significant reduction from Russia’s approximately 40,000 nuclear weapons possessed during the Cold War. In addition, through these reductions, both countries are fulfilling their obligations as nuclear-weapon states under the 1970 Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, to reduce and eventually disarm all of their nuclear weapons.
The Efforts for another START
New START has a single extension provision for an additional 5 years after the treaty entered into force. That was in 2021, and extending the treaty was one of the first acts of President Biden upon taking office. At that time, both the U.S. and Russia anticipated that we would be able to negotiate a new treaty in time before the February 6th, 2026, expiration date. Soon after I was sworn in as Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security in July 2021, I traveled with the U.S. Delegation to Geneva for our first of two meetings with the Russian delegation. We left those final discussions having established a structure for negotiations on a potential new Treaty and for discussions on other related security issues. We were looking forward to another meeting in 2022 to continue those bilateral talks.
Unfortunately, those plans for another meeting between the U.S. and Russia to discuss a new treaty and related issues were derailed once Russia invaded Ukraine. Most of us realized there was still time to get back to the table and put in place another treaty. In addition, the U.S., while unsure how our relationship with Russia would move forward, always assumed that both countries would continue to fully implement New START, as it remained a legal obligation for both and is in the interest of global security.
Unfortunately, the U.S. faced several challenges working with Russia on New START issues, specifically on continuing the treaty-mandated inspections and bilateral meetings. Eventually, Russia suspended the treaty in February 2023, ending the inspections and bilateral meetings. However, both the U.S. and Russia have been abiding by the treaty’s numerical limits, which the parties can verify, to the extent possible, by using national technical means. The U.S. continued its push for full implementation of New START, and starting in late 2023 and into 2024, the U.S. began making a louder call for Russia to return to discussions on a follow-on treaty. However, Russia tied such negotiations to its call for the U.S. to stop funding Ukraine. As we approached the end of 2024, Russia remained committed to that position until the end of the Biden administration.
In 2025, it became evident that even if negotiations resumed, there would not be enough time to finalize a new treaty to succeed New START. A logical next step, pushed by the arms control community, was for both sides to agree to remain within the treaty’s limits until they could return to the negotiating table. Such an agreement would not be legally binding since the treaty itself would have expired. However, as two sovereign states, both countries can agree to such a temporary extension.
Unfortunately, there was little on arms control issues from the Trump administration during the campaign leading up to the 2024 election, and there has still been very little focus on these issues or interest shown. Last year, the Department of State also laid off several experts on arms control and disarmament, which, whether intended or not, was a clear signal to Russia of the administration’s lack of interest in these matters. There is little mention of arms control and disarmament in the recent National Security Strategy. As a result, there was skepticism about whether the U.S. would reach out to Russia to request a voluntary, non-binding extension of the treaty limits to give both countries more time to consider the next steps.
In September 2025, Putin proposed to Trump a one-year voluntary extension of New START’s central limits.[2] Trump responded that it ‘sounds like a good idea’, but no formal response followed. As we all await a response, my concern is that there is little evidence of anyone in Trump’s circle with expertise in arms control or the background and history of New START who can argue for the positive aspects of a temporary extension of the limits. My understanding is that interlocutors at the NSC who departed after the Biden administration have not been replaced. Rather, given what appears to be a more militaristic nature of this administration and a lack of appreciation for diplomacy and soft power, it may lead to either no answer or a negative response to Putin’s offer.
Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov has noted that Moscow has no contacts in the U.S. regarding New START. This was a clear message from Russia: it is not seeing any response and does not know who to engage with on the matter. Who is leading these issues in the United States now, since the traditional NSC and State Department structures have been shuttered or significantly changed? This is likely the first time Russia has made such a statement regarding a U.S. interlocutor, because that expertise and readiness to engage Russia on these matters have existed for years within the NSC and at the Department of State. Russia says it has no specific contacts with the US on the expiring nuclear treaty. Not only have we not responded to Russia, but President Trump also said, “If it expires, it expires,” and “We’ll just do a better agreement.” I won’t get into how unrealistic it is to assume we can just agree to another treaty, particularly when the U.S. shows no interest in such an agreement, and we have already seen how difficult it is to get back to another agreement with Iran after President Trump’s withdrawal in 2018 from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action. ‘If it expires, it expires,’ Trump tells NYT about US-Russia nuclear treaty. Finally, Trump has again reiterated an issue that was pushed during his first administration: bringing China into the bilateral discussions. China has shown no interest in being included and has reiterated its position that it would be “neither reasonable nor realistic to ask China to join the nuclear disarmament negotiations with the U.S. and Russia.”
President Trump should say yes to a temporary extension. Doing so not only preserves the last treaty between the two countries, but it can also lead to additional reductions of nuclear weapons. Such negotiations can raise other issues for discussion, such as tactical nuclear weapons, the development of new types of weapons, including hypersonic weapons, and possibly space issues. While there is no guarantee of a final agreement on a new Treaty in the future, saying yes will, at a minimum, keep the channels of communication open on these issues, which could become more serious if the two countries enter real negotiations. The answer will also signal to the international community whether the U.S. administration will increasingly rely on the military as the basis of its foreign policy, or affirm a belief in the value of treaties, diplomacy, and international law.
[1] The term “deployed” here can be defined as a system operational and ready to go.
[2] Putin’s proposal stated: “Russia is prepared to continue observing the treaty’s central quantitative restrictions for one year after February 5, 2026. Following that date, based on a careful assessment of the situation, we will make a definite decision on whether to uphold these voluntary self-limitations. We believe that this measure is only feasible if the United States acts in a similar spirit and refrains from steps that would undermine or disrupt the existing balance of deterrence.” Statement by the President of the Russian Federation Vladimir Putin on the issue of the forthcoming expiry of the New START Treaty